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International Law, Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The human rights movement has spent considerable energy developing and promoting 
the adoption of both international and domestic legal prohibitions against torture. 
Empirical scholarship testing the effectiveness of these prohibitions using observational 
data, however, has produced mixed results. In this paper, we explore one possible 
mechanism through which these prohibitions may be effective: dampening public support 
for torture. Specifically, we conducted a survey experiment to explore the impact of 
international and constitutional law on public support for torture. We found that a bare 
majority of respondents in our control group support the use of torture, and that 
presenting respondents with arguments that this practice violates international law or 
constitutional law did not produce a statistically significant decrease in support. These 
findings are consistent with prior research suggesting, even in democracies, that legal 
prohibitions on torture have been ineffective.  
 
 
Key Words: Human Rights; Torture; International Law; Constitutional Law; Survey 
Experiment; Public Opinion  
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Introduction 
 
 One of the primary goals of the modern human rights movement has been 
stopping governments from torturing their citizens. In order to achieve this goal, 
considerable effort has been spent developing and promoting the adoption of both 
international and domestic legal prohibitions of torture. The efforts to promote both 
international and domestic torture bans have largely been successful. In fact, by 2011, 
156 countries had become party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and 157 countries had included 
torture prohibitions in their constitutions.1  
The empirical scholarship testing the effectiveness of these international and 
domestic torture prohibitions, however, has produced mixed results. For example, studies 
testing impact of the CAT have alternatively found that ratification of the treaty is 
associated with increased torture rates (Holleyer and Rosendorff 2011; Hill 2010; 
Vreeland 2008; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Neumayer 2005; Hathaway 2004), has 
had no effect on torture rates (Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009), and even that it is 
associated with decreases in torture rates (Fariss 2015; Fariss 2014). Similarly, studies 
testing the impact of constitutional torture prohibitions have both found that they have 
had no effect on torture rates (Chilton and Versteeg 2015; Melton 2013; Keith, Tate, and 
Poe 2009) and that they are associated with decreases in state repression (Hill and Jones 
2014).  
Part of the reason that this line of scholarship has produced conflicting results is 
that there are a number of substantial barriers to inference that make it difficult to assess 
the effectiveness of these measures with observational data alone. One of these barriers is 
that countries’ decisions to adopt international (Lupu 2013) and domestic (Chilton and 
Versteeg 2015) torture prohibitions are endogenous to their rights practices. Moreover, 
recent research has suggested that a great deal of the data has been used to measure rates 
of torture is biased because reporting standards have changed over time (Fariss 2014). 
Finally, even if it were possible to overcome these barriers to inference, it would still be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Maps showing the prevalence of international and constitutional torture bans are provided in the 
Supplemental Appendix.  
	   4 
difficult to disaggregate the impact of international and domestic torture bans because 
countries frequently adopt both forms of legal prohibitions (Chilton and Tingley 2013). 
Given these hurdles that observational research designs face, one increasingly 
common research strategy has been to use experimental methods to test the mechanisms 
that have been theorized as ways that legal restrictions may alter government behavior. 
More specifically, experiments have been used to test whether explicit references to 
international legal agreements results in changes in public support for policies that would 
violate these agreements (e.g. Mcentire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Tomz and Weeks 2014; 
Chilton 2015, 2014; Wallace 2014, 2013; Putnam and Shapiro 2009; Tomz 2008). For 
torture, it has been suggested that democracy is one of the mechanisms through which 
torture prohibitions might matter (Simmons 2009). Specifically, it is possible that when 
the public is told that torture violates the country’s legal commitments, this increases 
public disapproval of these practices. Although experimental methods have their own 
limitations, they do make it possible to design studies with high degrees of internal 
validity, and, as a result, provide a valuable supplement to the evidence that can be 
produced by observational studies.  
In order to comparatively test the effectiveness of both international and domestic 
prohibitions on torture, we have conducted what we believe to be the first survey 
experiment that simultaneously tests the effect of exposing respondents to arguments 
about the status of international law and constitutional law. More specifically, we fielded 
a survey experiment to a nationally representative sample of adults in the United States 
that asked respondents whether they supported the use of torture while randomly 
exposing some respondents to arguments that torture violates international law or 
constitutional law (or both). We also built on the limited prior research that has explored 
why arguments about international law change public opinion (Chilton 2014), and asked 
the respondents a series of six questions designed to test the mechanisms that may have 
lead our treatments to change respondents’ views.  
Our results are consistent with recent polling that suggests that a bare majority of 
Americans support the use of torture. What is more, we found that presenting respondents 
with the argument that torture violates international law did not produce a statistically 
significant decrease in support. Presenting respondents with the argument that torture 
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violates the constitution, however, lowered support for torture by 4.6 percentage points 
(although the effect falls just short of conventional levels of statistical significance). That 
said, the difference between our international law and constitutional law treatments was 
not itself statistically significant. We do find a more substantial effect for the sub-group 
of our respondents that identified as Democrats. Yet, overall, our findings suggest that 
information on the status of neither international law nor constitutional law has a 
substantial effect on public support for the use of torture.  
 
Research Design 
 
Subject Recruitment  
 
 We administered our experiment to a nationally representative sample of 2,159 
U.S. adults in October 2014. The experiment was administered online, and Survey 
Sampling International (SSI) recruited the respondents. SSI is a research firm based in the 
United States that conducts surveys for corporate and academic research. Our sample was 
specifically designed to be nationally representative of the U.S. adult population based on 
gender, age, race, and census region.2 
 
Experimental Design 
 
 We designed our experiment based on a survey used by Wallace (2013) to explore 
the effect of commitments to international law on public support for the use of torture. 
Wallace’s survey used a vignette to explore whether respondents expressed lower support 
for using torture to interrogate captured enemy combatants when they were randomly 
assigned to a group that was told that torture would violate international law and was 
prohibited by treaties the United States had signed. The strengths of Wallace’s vignette 
are that it was designed to: (1) present a realistic scenario; (2) not bias support of torture 
in any direction; (3) avoid inflammatory language; and (4) present a neutral stance of the 
effectiveness of torture (Wallace 2013, at 117-118).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Summary statistics for our sample are reported in the Supplemental Appendix. Both SSI’s internal 
information on the respondent that completed our survey and the responses to the demographic questions in 
our survey suggest that our sample is consistent with census estimates of the U.S. adult population based on 
gender, age, race, and census region.  
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 Although our survey used Wallace’s research as a starting point, we made a 
number of substantial changes to his experiment.3 Since Wallace’s goal was to assess the 
effects of international law on public opinion, his vignette focused on the use of torture to 
interrogate enemy combatants. For his purposes, the interrogation of enemy combatants 
provided a realistic scenario where respondents could be told that the use of torture was 
prohibited by international law. Since our goal is to compare the relative effectiveness of 
international law and constitutional law, we needed a scenario that was clearly prohibited 
by both international law and the American constitution. The torture of enemy 
combatants, however, is not clearly prohibited by the constitution.4 As a result, our 
vignette did not stipulate that the potential victims of torture where combatants from an 
opposing side. Instead, our vignette focused on a scenario where torture would plausibly 
be prohibited by both international and domestic law.5  
 More specifically, we started our vignette by presenting all respondents with the 
following scenario: “Throughout history, people have plotted to overthrow or sabotage 
the government, and have resorted to the use of violent means to do so. Occasionally, the 
military captures people that are conspiring to overthrow or sabotage the government 
through violent means.” The vignette then proceeded to say that: “[t]hese individuals may 
have information of interest about the conspiracy, such as the location of other 
conspirators or plans for future attacks. Some government officials believe interrogating 
these people through a variety of methods is a useful way to obtain this information.”  
We then introduced the possibility of torture by saying that: “[t]he interrogation 
methods could involve torture, meaning they would cause severe pain or suffering to the 
people they are used on.” Moreover, we added that “[t]he information may, or may not, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 We believe that these differences are substantial enough to make it inappropriate to directly compare our 
results to Wallace (2013). Moreover, in addition to changing the topic of our vignette, our survey was 
administered five years after Wallace’s. For instance, Wallace’s 2009 survey found that 44% of 
respondents in his control group supported the use of torture (Wallace 2013, at 120), while 51% of 
respondents in our control group supported the use of torture. This increase is consistent with public 
opinion polling showing that American’s have become more accepting of torture over that time period. See 
Brittany Lyte, Americans Have Grown More Supportive of Torture, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Dec. 9, 2014, 
available at http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-torture-report-public-opinion/ (last visited August 24, 
2015). See also Gronke et al. 2010. 
4 See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F. 3d 644, 663-67 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
5 Our vignette is presented in its entirety in the Supplemental Appendix.  
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be accurate or relevant to the conspiracy.” After this, the respondents were randomly 
presented with one of four treatment conditions. The four treatments were as follows: 
 
• Control: (No further information) 
• Int’l Law: “The interrogation methods would violate international law. The 
United States has signed international treaties that do not allow the use of these 
methods under any circumstances.” 
• Con. Law: “The interrogation methods would violate the constitution. The United 
States’ Constitution includes a provision that does not allow the use of these 
methods under any circumstances.” 
• Combined: “The interrogation methods would violate the constitution and 
international law. The United States’ Constitution includes a provision that does 
not allow the use of these methods under any circumstances, and the United States 
has signed international treaties that do not allow the use of these methods under 
any circumstances.”6 
 
The respondents in the Control group were not presented with an argument about 
the legal status of the use of torture. The inclusion of this control group gives us a 
baseline to compare the subsequent treatment groups against.7 The respondents in the 
Int’l Law group were presented with the argument that the use of these methods violates 
international law. The wording of this treatment condition is identical to the international 
law treatment used by Wallace (2013). The respondents in the Con. Law group were 
presented with the argument that the use of these methods violates the constitution. This 
treatment condition was designed to be as similar to the international law group as 
possible (for example, the treatments include the same number of words, tone, and 
sentence structure). Finally, respondents in the Combined group were presented with 
both arguments. Offering some respondents both arguments allows us to evaluate 
whether there is an “additive” or “substitution” effect to being given both arguments 
(Tomz 2008; Chilton 2015).  
 After being presented with the vignette and one of the four randomly assigned 
treatments, respondents were asked: “[t]o what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: The United States should use interrogation methods involving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 To avoid any potential ordering effects, half of the respondents that received the combined treatment were 
told about constitutional law first and half of the respondents were told about international law first.  
7 As a number of scholars have pointed out, because the respondents in the control group may already be 
aware that torture is prohibited by international law and the constitution, it is unfortunately impossible to 
have a perfect control group for this type of experiment. This suggests that our experiment thus provides a 
hard test of whether international or constitutional law changes public opinion.  
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torture on people that have plotted to overthrow or sabotage the government.” The 
respondents were then asked to provide an answer on a six-point scale that included the 
following options: (1) “strongly disagree”; (2) “disagree”; (3) “lean towards disagree”; 
(4) “lean towards agree”; (5) “agree”; and (6) “strongly agree.” Following Wallace 
(2013), we converted these responses into a binary variable for easier interpretation. Our 
results are substantively similar, however, when using the full six-point response variable 
as the dependent variable.8 
 
Balance 
 
 In addition to presenting respondents with the vignette described above, we also 
asked respondents a series of demographic questions.9 Doing so not only allows us to 
confirm that our respondents are nationally representative based on their gender, age, 
race, and census region, but also allows us to ensure that the demographic characteristics 
of the respondents in each of our treatment groups were balanced. To do so, we followed 
Chaudoin (2014) and used the balance test from Hansen & Bowers (2008). Using this 
test, the overall χ2 statistic and the associated overall p-values for each group are: Control, 
11.10 (p = 0.35); Int’l Law, 3.47 (p = 0.97); Con. Law, 9.02 (p = 0.53); Combined, 4.95 
(p = 0.90). We thus did not find any evidence of demographic imbalance across our four 
treatment groups.  
 
Results 
 
Primary Results 
 
Figure 1 presents the primary results of our experiment.10 Since we did not find 
any evidence of imbalance across our randomly assigned treatments, Figure 1 simply 
reports the mean responses—and 90% confidence intervals—for each our of four 
treatment groups. 11  All of our results, however, are substantively the same when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Results using the full six-point response scale are presented in the Supplemental Appendix. 
9 We asked the demographic questions in our survey before presenting respondents with the vignette. 
10 Numerical results for all of our Figures are reported in the Supplemental Appendix.  
11 Because we primarily find null effects, we elected to use a 90% confidence interval to avoid rejecting 
treatment effects too quickly. We note, however, that none of the treatment effects are statistically 
significant at the more conventional 95% level. 
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estimated using regressions that control for the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents.12  
 
Figure 1: Primary Results (mean response and 90% CIs) 
 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, respondents in the Control group were on balance more likely 
to agree than disagree with the use of torture. For the control group, the mean level of 
support for using torture against people that have plotted to overthrow the government is 
51.1% (90% CI: 47.4%, 54.7%). This number closely tracks the recent public polling on 
the use of torture: a 2011 Pew survey found that 53% of Americans said that torture could 
often or sometimes be justified,13 and a 2013 AP and NORC survey found that 50% of 
Americans said that torture could often or sometimes be justified.14  
  Respondents in the Int’l Law group had a mean response of 49.2% (90% CI: 
45.6%, 52.7%). Although the respondents given the Int’l Law treatment did express 
lower support for the use of torture than the control group, the difference between the two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 These results are presented in the Supplemental Appendix.  
13  Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/09/americans-views-on-use-of-torture-in-
fighting-terrorism-have-been-mixed/ (last visited August 24, 2015).  
14 Available at: http://www.apnorc.org/PDFs/Balancing%20Act/AP-NORC%202013_Civil%20Liberties 
%20Poll_Report.pdf (last visited August 24, 2015). 
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groups is not statistically significant (p = 0.54). The respondents in the Con. Law group 
had a mean response of 46.5% (90% CI: 43.0%, 50.0%). Although the difference 
between the Control group and the Con. Law group is not statistically significant at the 
0.1 level using the binary response variable (p = 0.14), it is statistically significant when 
using the full six-point response variable, albeit only at the 0.1 level (p = 0.08). That said, 
the difference in support between the Int’l Law treatment and Con. Law treatment is not 
statistically different (p = 0.38).  
 Figure 1 also reveals that the respondents in the Combined group had a mean 
response of 50.2% (90% CI: 46.7%, 53.7%). Interestingly, this is only slightly lower than 
the mean response for the Control group (p = 0.77). Moreover, the Combined group—
whose members were presented with both the international law and constitutional law 
treatments—were more supportive of torture than the respondents that were given either 
just the Int’l Law treatment or the Con. Law treatment. Since the differences between the 
Combined group and the other treatments are substantially small and far from statistically 
significant,15 we believe that it would be inappropriate to put much weight on them.  
It is still interesting, however, that the respondents that received the Combined 
treatment were more likely to support torture than the respondents receiving either 
treatment individually. Given the evidence from Tomz (2008) and Chilton (2015) that 
arguments about the status of international law had an additive effect when combined 
with non-legal arguments, this is a surprising result that likely cannot simply be explained 
by the fact that the respondents that were presented with the combined treatment were 
less likely to read their slightly longer vignette. One possible explanation for our results 
is that these previous studies did not test combining two legal arguments, and instead 
combined arguments about international law with economic or moral arguments. It is 
possible that informing respondents that government officials are advocating for using 
interrogation techniques including torture despite the fact that it would violate 
international law and the constitution sends a signal that these officials have particularly 
good reasons for wanting to use torture in that instance. More research will have to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The difference in support between the Combined group and the Int’l Law group has a p-value of 0.74, 
and the difference between the Combined group and the Con. Law group has a p-value of 0.22. 
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conducted, however, to verify the higher support for rights violations when using 
combined legal treatments and to test the theory we have suggested.  
 Taken together, these results do not reveal any statistically significant differences 
between our four treatment groups. Given these null results, it is reasonable to calculate 
how large a difference between the control group and a treatment group would have been 
needed to find a statistically significant result. With our samples sizes and standard 
deviations, it would have taken an effect size of roughly 5.4% to find a difference that 
was statistically significant at the 0.1 level and an effect size of roughly 6.0% to find a 
difference that was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. To put this in perspective, the 
level of support for torture was 4.6% lower for our Con. Law group compared to the 
Control group (which, as previously noted, fell just short of statistical significant at the 
0.1 level). 
 
Results by Party Identification 
 
We also examined whether the political affiliations of the respondents influenced 
their responses.16 The results broken out by respondents that identified themselves as 
either Democrats or Republicans are presented in Figure 2.17  
There are three things worth nothing about our results based on party 
identification. First, Democrats in all four treatment groups were consistently less likely 
than Republicans to support the use of torture: the mean response for Democrats was 
47.8% (90% CI: 45.1%, 50.6%), whereas the mean response for Republicans was 61.7% 
(90% CI: 58.1%, 65.2%). This is consistent with both public polling showing that 
Republicans are more supportive of torture18 and the finding in Wallace (2013) that 
conservatives were more likely to support torture than liberals. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 We should note that, following Chilton (2014) and Wallace (2013), analyzing our results by party 
identification was part of our initial analysis plan.  
17 Out of the 2,159 respondents in our sample, 891 identified themselves as Democrats (41%) and 514 
identified themselves as Republicans (24%). Recent polling from the Pew research center suggests that 
32% of Americans identify as Democrats and 23% as Republicans. See http://www.people-
press.org/interactives/party-id-trend/ (last visited August 24, 2015). Since our survey slightly oversampled 
Democrats and our treatment effect were larger for Democrats, it suggests that our null findings are not due 
to our sample being ideologically unrepresentative.  
18 See Brittany Lyte, Americans Have Grown More Supportive of Torture, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Dec. 9, 
2014, available at http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-torture-report-public-opinion/ (last visited 
August 24, 2015). See also Gronke et al. 2010. 
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Figure 2: Results by Party Identification (mean response and 90% CIs) 
 
 
Second, the international law and constitutional law treatments had an effect on 
support for torture among Democrats but not Republicans. For Democrats, both the Int’l 
Law group and Con. Law group had a lower mean response than the Control group that is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The Control group for Democrats had a mean 
response of 55.4% (90% CI: 49.5%, 61.3%), while the Int’l Law group had a mean 
response of 43.9% (90% CI: 38.4%, 49.4%) and the Con. Law group had a mean 
response of 43.9% (90% CI: 38.6%, 49.1%). For Republicans, however, the results for all 
four treatment conditions are nearly identical. This result is consistent with the finding in 
Wallace (2013) that the international law treatment lowered support for torture among 
liberals, but had almost no effect on support for torture among conservatives.  
Third, it is puzzling that our results by party identification are consistent with 
Wallace (2013), but that our overall results are not consistent with Wallace’s finding that 
presenting respondents with arguments that torture violates international law statistically 
significantly lowers support for torture. We explored three possibilities for this 
inconsistency. First, we considered whether this inconsistency is due to the composition 
of our samples. Wallace’s sample had 26% self-reported liberals, while our sample had 
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41% self-reported Democrats. We do not think that this cannot explain the inconsistency, 
because our larger proportion of Democrats should bias us towards finding statistically 
significant results in the full sample. Second, we considered whether this inconsistency 
emerges because our treatment groups are not balanced based on party identification. Re-
conducting the balance test from Hansen & Bowers (2008) while including variables for 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, however, does not reveal any evidence that 
our treatment groups are not balanced.19 Third, we considered whether this inconsistency 
arises because of differences between the responses of moderates in Wallace’s sample 
and the responses of independents in our sample. Wallace’s replication data reveals that 
moderates presented with his international law treatment were 7.5% less likely to support 
the use of torture than respondents in his control group.20 In contrast, in our sample 
independents presented with the Int’l Law treatment were nearly 10% more likely to 
support the use of torture than the control group, and independents presented with the 
Con. Law treatment were 0.04% more likely to support more likely to support the use of 
torture than the control group. This suggests that the inconsistencies between our overall 
results and Wallace (2013) are due to the independents responding negatively or neutrally 
to our law treatments. Future research should explore whether this is due to changes in 
the views of independents over time, the differences in our vignettes, or idiosyncrasies in 
the composition our of samples.  
 
Mechanism Questions 
 
We also attempted to test the mechanisms that may lead arguments about 
international law or constitutional law to change public support for torture. To our 
knowledge, the only previous study that has directly explored possible mechanisms for 
why arguments about international change public opinion was Chilton (2014). After 
conducting an experiment on how arguments about international law change support for 
solitary confinement, Chilton (2014) asked respondents questions designed to test reasons 
why the international law argument changed respondents’ views. The results suggested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 While including the party identification variables, the overall χ2 statistic and the associated overall p-
values for each group are: Control, 19.4 (p = 0.11); Int’l Law, 10.9 (p = 0.62); Con. Law, 13.5 (p = 0.41); 
Combined, 8.01 (p = 0.84). 
20 See https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/19881 (last visited January 31, 
2016).  
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that the respondents that received the argument about international law were more likely 
to believe that it was important that U.S. treatment of prisoners conform to international 
standards.  
After respondents read our vignette, we also asked a series of six additional 
questions to assess the mechanisms through which our Int’l Law and Con. Law 
treatments may influence public support for the use of torture. Those questions are 
reported in Table 1. We randomized the order respondents were asked these six 
questions, and for each we asked for responses on a five-point scale (with 5 representing 
strong agreement and 1 representing strong disagreement). The responses to these six 
questions are presented in Figure 3. 
 
Table 1: Mechanism Questions 
International Standards Should the United States’ interrogation practices always conform to international standards? 
Constitutional Standards Should the United States’ interrogation practices always conform to U.S. constitutional standards? 
Risk to Americans If the United States tortures, do you think that other countries will be more likely to torture captured Americans? 
Risk to Others If the United States tortures, do you think that other countries will be more likely to torture their own citizens? 
Valuable Information 
Do you think the use of torture by the United States is likely 
to produce valuable information that could not otherwise be 
obtained? 
Morality Is the use of torture immoral? 
 
 
Overall, the results in Figure 3 indicate that the treatments that respondents 
received while reading our vignette had essentially no influence on the subsequent 
responses to the six mechanism questions we asked. In fact, the differences in mean 
responses for the Control group and the Int’l Law group were not statistically significant 
at the 0.1 level for a single one of the six mechanism questions. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that, as the previous results sections revealed, the responses for the 
Control group and the Int’l Law group for our primary experiment were not different in a 
statistically significant way.  
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Figure 3: Results to Mechanism Questions (mean response and 90% CIs)
	  
 
 
There were, however, statistically significant differences between the Control 
group and Con. Law group for two of the six questions. The respondents who received 
the Con. Law treatment were less likely to think that torture produces Valuable 
Information (p = 0.03) and less likely to think that the United States interrogation 
practices should conform to International Standards (p = 0.01). One explanation for 
why respondents in the Con. Law group may believe that torture is less likely to produce 
valuable information than respondents in the control group is that respondents may 
believe that these interrogation techniques would not have been constitutionally 
prohibited if they produce important information. In other words, the constitutional law 
argument may prime respondents to think that torture is less useful. One explanation for 
why respondents in the Con. Law group are less likely think that United States 
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interrogation practices should conform to International Standards than respondents in the 
control group is that the respondents may think that international standards are less 
relevant after they have been told about domestic, constitutional standards that restrict 
torture. For example, if the respondents in the Con. Law group thought that the 
constitution had stricter limits on torture than international law, they would be less likely 
to think that the United States’ interrogation practices should “always conform” to 
international standards. 
Although these are small differences for only two of the six mechanisms 
questions, it does provide some additional—but admittedly very weak—evidence that 
information on Constitutional Law has a slightly larger effect on support for torture than 
information on International law. That said, like with our primary results, the difference 
in mean responses between the Int’l Law group and Con. Law group for both the 
International Standards and Valuable Information questions were substantively small and 
far from statistically significant. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Our experiment was designed to explore how information about international law 
and constitutional law impacts public support for the use of torture. While we found no 
evidence that information about international law changed public opinion, we found some 
weak evidence that information about constitutional law did. Specifically, using a binary 
response scale, we found that presenting respondents with the argument that 
constitutional law prohibits torture lowered public support for torture by 4.6 percentage 
points. The effect, however, falls outside conventional levels of statistical significance. 
That said, although the argument about constitutional law had a slightly larger effect than 
the argument about international law, there was not a statistically significantly difference 
between these two arguments. In general, our findings suggest that presenting 
respondents with the arguments that international law and constitutional law prohibits 
torture has little effect on public support for its use.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 It is worth noting that our findings diverge slightly, however, from the finding in Wallace (2013) that 
presenting respondents with information about international law slightly reduces public support for torture. 
As previously noted, however, we made a substantive change to the vignette by asking respondents about 
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It is worth noting that there are several limitations to our research design that may 
limit the generalizability of our results. First, since respondents may already be aware 
that international law and constitutional law prohibit torture, our experiment cannot 
directly test the effect that international and constitutional torture prohibitions have on 
public opinion. Instead, our experiment can only test the effect that presenting 
respondents with arguments about the status of these sources of law has on public support 
for torture. As a result, despite the fact that our international law and constitutional law 
treatments had little effect, it may be the case that both international and domestic torture 
prohibitions do have an impact public support for torture but that we simply cannot 
measure it because our control group is also aware of the prohibitions. Second, we only 
tested one vignette on a sample of respondents from one country. It may be the case that 
arguments about the status of international and constitutional law would have a different 
effect in other scenarios, or that respondents from other countries would responded 
differently than the sample we recruited in the United States.  
Despite those limitations, our findings do help to explain existing findings from 
observational studies on the effectiveness of torture prohibitions. Our finding is 
consistent with the observational studies that suggest that CAT ratification (e.g. Lupu 
2013; Powell and Staton 2009) and constitutional torture prohibitions (e.g. Chilton and 
Versteeg 2015; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009) do not reduce torture. Our research is also 
consistent with studies that suggest that even democratic governments are likely to 
engage in torture—especially in the face of terror threats or violent dissent (Goderis and 
Versteeg 2011; Conrad and Moore 2010; Davenport, Moore and Armstrong 2007; Rejali 
2007; Wantchekon and Healy 1999). While our findings do not directly prove that lack of 
popular support indeed causes legal torture prohibitions to fail, they suggest that this is at 
least a factor that contributes to their ineffectiveness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
torturing individuals trying to over throw the government instead of torturing combatants from an opposing 
side of a conflict. Wallace’s vignette focused on prisoners of war, and there may be good reasons for 
respondents to be more responsive to information on international law when considering conduct during 
war. For example, although democracies’ may be no more likely to restrain from torturing domestically 
because of international human rights treaties (Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009), there is evidence 
suggesting that democracies are more likely to comply with the laws of war because of the threat of 
reciprocity (Morrow 2014; Chilton 2015; but see Downes 2008). Respondents to Wallace’s survey may 
have thus thought that compliance with international law was more important when dealing with the enemy 
from an opposing side of a conflict.  
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International Law, Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture 
 
 
Supplemental Appendix 
 
The information in this appendix is broken into seven parts. Those parts present: (1) 
information on the countries that have adopted international and domestic prohibitions 
against torture; (2) descriptive statistics for the respondents that took our survey; (3) the 
vignette used in our survey; (4) the wording of our mechanism questions; (5) the results 
of our survey using a binary response scale; (6) the results of our survey using the full 
six-point response scale; and (7) the results of our survey using regressions that control 
for the demographic characteristics of the respondents.  
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1. Countries that have Adopted International and Domestic Torture Prohibitions 
 
 
Countries that Ratified the Convention Against Torture by 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries that Adopted a Constitutional Torture Prohibition by 2012 
 
 
  
CAT ratification by 2012
not ratified
ratified
No data
constittional torture prohibitions
no torture prohibition by 2012
torture prohibition by 2012
No data
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2. Demographic Characteristics of our Sample 
 
Summary Statistics of the Sample 
 Mean Stand. Dev. Total 
Male 0.49 0.50 1,048 
Age 46.19 16.80 2,153 
Race    
     Caucasian 0.78 0.42 1,674 
     African American 0.12 0.33 261 
     Asian 0.05 0.21 101 
     Pacific Islander 0.02 0.12 34 
     Native American 0.00 0.04 3 
     Other 0.04 0.20 86 
Census Region    
     Northeast 0.19 0.39 405 
     Midwest 0.21 0.41 452 
     South 0.37 0.48 805 
     West 0.23 0.42 497 
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3. Vignette Used in Our Survey 
 
“Throughout history, people have plotted to overthrow or sabotage the government, and 
have resorted to the use of violent means to do so. Occasionally, the military captures 
people that are conspiring to overthrow or sabotage the government through violent 
means. These individuals may have information of interest about the conspiracy, such as 
the location of other conspirators or plans for future attacks. Some government officials 
believe interrogating these people through a variety of methods is a useful way to obtain 
this information. 
  
The interrogation methods could involve torture, meaning they would cause severe pain 
or suffering to the people they are used on. The information may, or may not, be accurate 
or relevant to the conspiracy. 
  
[Treatment] 
  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
  
The United States should use interrogation methods involving torture on people that have 
plotted to overthrow or sabotage the government.” 
 
Treatment Options 
 
• Control: (no further information provided) 
 
• International Law Treatment: “The interrogation methods would violate 
international law. The United States has signed international treaties that do not 
allow the use of these methods under any circumstances.” 
 
• Constitutional Law Treatment: “The interrogation methods would violate the 
constitution. The United States’ Constitution includes a provision that does not 
allow the use of these methods under any circumstances.” 
 
• Combined Treatment (1): “The interrogation methods would violate the 
constitution and international law. The United States’ Constitution includes a 
provision that does not allow the use of these methods under any circumstances, 
and the United States has signed international treaties that do not allow the use of 
these methods under any circumstances.” 
 
• Combined Treatment (2): “The interrogation methods would violate the 
international law and the constitution. The United States has signed international 
treaties that do not allow the use of these methods under any circumstances, and 
the United States’ Constitution includes a provision that does not allow the use of 
these methods under any circumstances.” 
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4. Wording of the Mechanism Questions 
 
Following the vignette, these questions were presented to respondents in random order 
and on separate screens.  
 
International Standards 
“Should the United States’ interrogation practices always conform to international 
standards?” 
• Strongly Agree (5) 
• Agree (4) 
• Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
• Disagree (2)  
• Strongly Disagree (1) 
 
Constitutional Standards 
“Should the United States’ interrogation practices always conform to U.S. constitutional 
standards?” 
• Strongly Agree (5) 
• Agree (4) 
• Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
• Disagree (2)  
• Strongly Disagree (1) 
 
Risk to Americans 
“If the United States tortures, do you think that other countries will be more likely to 
torture captured Americans?” 
• Definitely Yes (5) 
• Probably Yes (4) 
• Maybe (3) 
• Probably Not (2)  
• Definitely Not (1) 
 
Risk to Others 
“If the United States tortures, do you think that other countries will be more likely to 
torture their own citizens?” 
• Definitely Yes (5) 
• Probably Yes (4) 
• Maybe (3) 
• Probably Not (2)  
• Definitely Not (1) 
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Valuable Information 
“Do you think the use of torture by the United States is likely to produce valuable 
information that could not otherwise be obtained?” 
• Definitely Yes (5) 
• Probably Yes (4) 
• Maybe (3) 
• Probably Not (2)  
• Definitely Not (1) 
 
Morality 
“Is the use of torture immoral?” 
• Definitely Yes (5) 
• Probably Yes (4) 
• Maybe (3) 
• Probably Not (2)  
• Definitely Not (1) 
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5. Survey Results – Tables using Binary Response Variable 
 
 
Figure 1 Results - Mean Response and 90% CI (% approval) 
Control  
Treatment 
Int’l Law 
Treatment 
Con. Law 
Treatment 
Combined 
Treatment 
Total 
51.1 49.2 46.5 50.2 49.2 
(47.4, 54.7) (45.6, 52.7) (43.0, 50.0) (46.7, 53.4) (47.4, 51.0) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Results - Mean Response and 90% CI (% approval) 
 Control 
Treatment 
Int’l Law 
Treatment 
Con. Law 
Treatment 
Combined 
Treatment 
Total 
Democrats 55.4 (49.5, 61.3) 
43.9 
(38.4, 49.4) 
43.9 
(38.6, 49.1) 
49.3 
(43.9, 54.8) 
47.8 
(45.1,50.6) 
      
Republicans 60.9 (54.0, 67.8) 
60.8 
(53.5, 68.1) 
62.6 
(55.6, 69.6) 
62.5 
(55.1, 69.9) 
61.7 
(58.1, 65.2) 
 
 
Figure 3 Results - Mean Response and 90% CI (on five-point scale) 
 Control 
Treatment 
Int’l Law 
Treatment 
Con. Law 
Treatment 
Combined 
Treatment 
International Standards 3.67 (3.59, 3.74) 
3.57 
(3.49, 3.65) 
3.50 
(3.43, 3.57) 
3.64 
(3.57, 3.72) 
     
Constitutional Standards 3.86 (3.78, 3.93) 
3.86 
(3.79, 3.94) 
3.88 
(3.81, 3.95) 
3.90 
(3.82, 3.97) 
     
Risk to Americans 4.14 (4.07, 4.21) 
4.21 
(4.14, 4.28) 
4.22 
(4.16, 4.28) 
4.24 
(4.17, 4.30) 
     
Risk to Others 3.59 (3.51, 3.67) 
3.67 
(3.60, 3.74) 
3.55 
(3.48, 3.63) 
3.66 
(3.58, 3.73) 
     
Valuable Information 3.49 (3.41, 3.57) 
3.39 
(3.31, 3.47) 
3.34 
(3.26, 3.41) 
3.36 
(3.28, 3.44) 
     
Morality 3.74 (3.66, 3.83) 
3.77 
(3.68, 3.85) 
3.81 
(3.73, 3.89) 
3.84 
(3.75,3.92) 
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6. Survey Results – Tables using Six-Point Response Variable 
 
 
Figure 1 Results - Mean Response and 90% CI (on six-point scale) 
Control  
Treatment 
Int’l Law 
Treatment 
Con. Law 
Treatment 
Combined 
Treatment 
Total 
3.46 3.33 3.25 3.38 3.35 
(3.31, 3.60) (3.20, 3.47) (3.11, 3.38) (3.24, 3.52) (3.28, 3.42) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Results - Mean Response and 90% CI (on six-point scale) 
 Control 
Treatment 
Int’l Law 
Treatment 
Con. Law 
Treatment 
Combined 
Treatment 
Total 
Democrats 3.59 (3.36, 3.83) 
3.13 
(2.91, 3.34) 
3.12 
(2.91, 3.32) 
3.34 
(3.12, 3.56) 
3.28 
(3.17, 3.39) 
      
Republicans 3.92 (3.64, 4.20) 
3.82 
(3.54, 4.12) 
3.96 
(3.68, 4.24) 
3.97 
(3.67, 4.26) 
3.92 
(3.78, 4.06) 
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7. Survey Results – Regression Analysis 
 
 
Results from Figures 1 & 2 – Using Binary Response Variable 
 (1) 
All 
Respondents 
(2) 
Democratic 
Respondents 
(3) 
Republican 
Respondents 
Int’l Law Treatment -0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.51** 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
    
Con. Law Treatment -0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.51** 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.26) 
    
Combined Treatment -0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.30 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
    
Male 0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.20 
(0.14) 
0.63*** 
(0.19) 
    
Age -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
    
Caucasian 0.08 
(0.23) 
0.25 
(0.34) 
0.80 
(0.75) 
    
African American 0.28 
(0.25) 
0.60* 
(0.36) 
1.37 
(1.12) 
    
Asian 0.57* 
(0.30) 
0.88* 
(0.45) 
0.94 
(0.90) 
    
Pacific Islander 0.20 
(0.41) 
0.63 
(0.68) 
8.37 
(27.82) 
    
Native American -7.07 
(21.16) 
--  
    
Northeast 0.18 
(0.14) 
0.39* 
(0.21) 
0.52* 
(0.31) 
    
Midwest 0.11 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.36 
(0.29) 
    
South 0.15 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.40 
(0.25) 
    
N 2,153 886 514 
-- * < 0.1, ** <0.05, *** <0.01 
-- All regressions use logit models.  
-- Standard errors are in parentheses.  
-- Constants are not reported.  
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 Results from Figures 1 & 2 – Using Six-Point Response Variable 
 (1) 
All 
Respondents 
(2) 
Democratic 
Respondents 
(3) 
Republican 
Respondents 
Int’l Law Treatment -0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.47*** 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(0.22) 
    
Con. Law Treatment -0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.43** 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
    
Combined Treatment -0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.26 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.23) 
    
Male 0.29*** 
(0.08) 
0.31** 
(0.12) 
0.45*** 
(0.16) 
    
Age -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
    
Caucasian 0.07 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.30) 
0.17 
(0.64) 
    
African American 0.22 
(0.23) 
0.26 
(0.32) 
1.38 
(0.96) 
    
Asian 0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.35 
(0.39) 
0.60 
(0.75) 
    
Pacific Islander 0.35 
(0.37) 
0.71 
(0.62) 
1.15 
(0.99) 
    
Native American -1.08 
(0.97) 
--  
    
Northeast 0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.35* 
(0.18) 
0.49* 
(0.26) 
    
Midwest 0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.24) 
    
South 0.20** 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
0.42 
(0.22) 
    
N 2,153 886 514 
-- * < 0.1, ** <0.05, *** <0.01 
-- All regressions use ordered-logit models.  
-- Standard errors are in parentheses.  
-- Constants are not reported.  
 
